Lambdia

Game theory

5 artículos
NimNash equilibriumCooperative gameNon cooperative game theorySequential gameStochastic gameBargainingMarket designSearch and matching theoryMax min inequalityDrama theoryConfrontation analysisWalrasian auctionGame theory on networksSocial choice theoryMathematical programming with equilibrium constraintsAsynchronyBackward inductionBattle of the sexesBayes correlated equilibriumBayesian efficiencyBayesian gameBayesian nash equilibriumBayesian regretBehavioral strategyBerge equilibriumBertrand competitionBertrandedgeworth modelBertrands ballot theoremBest responseBlotto gameCentipede gameChickenCommon knowledgeComplete informationComplete mixingConjectural variationConstant sumContingent cooperatorCoordination gameCorrelated equilibriumCountersignalingCournot competitionCournot gameCursed equilibriumDeadlockDictator gameDiners dilemmaEl farol bar problemElectronic mail gameEpsilon equilibriumExpected utility hypothesisFair cake cuttingFair divisionFarsightednessFocal pointFolk theoremGame of chickenGame theory in communication networksGeneral equilibrium theoryGlicksbergs theoremGrim triggerGuess 2 3 of the averageHierarchy of beliefsImperfect informationIncomplete informationIndividual rationalityInduction puzzlesInformation setIterated elimination of dominated strategiesKeynesian beauty contestKuhns theoremKy fan inequalityMarkov perfect equilibriumMarkov strategyMatching penniesMax dominated strategyMean payoff gameMertens stable equilibriumMetagame analysisMinimax algorithmMinimax theoremMinimum effort gameMutual knowledgeMutual knowledge logicN player gameNash equilibriaNash equilibrium computationNon credible threatOne shot deviation principleOptional prisoners dilemmaOutcomePareto efficiencyParthasarathys theoremPayoff dominancePeace war gamePerfect bayesian equilibriumPerfect informationPerfect recallPirate gamePlatonia dilemmaPlyPrincess and monster gamePrisoners dilemmaProgram equilibriumProper equilibriumPublic goods gamePure strategyPurification theoremQuantal response equilibriumQuasi perfect equilibriumRationalizable strategyRendezvous problemRisk dominanceRock paper scissorsSatisfaction equilibriumSelf confirming equilibriumSequential equilibriumSignallingSimultaneous action selectionSimultaneous gameSocial trapSolution conceptSpiteStackelberg competitionStag huntStochastically stable equilibriumStrategic complementsStrategic dominanceStrategic fair divisionStrategic formStrategic moveStrategyStrong nash equilibriumSubgameSubgame perfect equilibriumSuccinct gameSuperrationalitySwap regretTit for tatTopological gameTragedy of the commonsTravelers dilemmaTrembling hand perfect equilibriumTruelTrust gameTruthful cake cuttingTwo level game theoryUltimatum gameUncorrelated asymmetryUnscrupulous diners dilemmaUtility functionVolunteers dilemmaVon neumannmorgenstern utility theoremWait walk dilemmaWinstay loseswitchWinwin gameZero sumZero sum gameZero sum problemAlbert w tuckerAlvin e rothAmos tverskyAnatol rapoportAntoine augustin cournotAppeasementAriel rubinsteinBehavioral game theoryBertrand edgeworth modelBounded rationalityCollusionCompetitive altruismComplete contractComputational complexity of gamesConflict escalationContract theoryCoopetitionCultural group selectionDavid k levineDavid m krepsDe escalationDeterrence theoryDonald b gilliesDrew fudenbergDynamic inconsistencyEdgeworth price cycleEric maskinEscalation of commitmentEvolution and the theory of gamesFishers principleGeorge r priceGibbs lemmaGift exchange gameHarold w kuhnHelly metricHerbert scarfHerestheticHerv moulinHobbesian trapIncomplete contractsInequity aversionJean fran ois mertensJean tiroleJennifer tour chayesJohn conwayJohn maynard smithJohn nashKen binmoreKenneth arrowLeonid hurwiczMartin shubikMelvin dresherMerrill m floodMobbingMove by natureMulti agent systemMyerson satterthwaite theoremNegotiation theoryObligationesOlga bondarevaOpen loop modelOskar morgensternPaul milgromPeyton youngPreferencePrim read theoryQuantum game theoryRational agentRational ignoranceRational irrationalityRationalityReinhard seltenRobert aumannRobert axelrodRobert b wilsonRoger myersonSamuel bowlesSocial softwareStrategic interactionSuzanne scotchmerTerminal investment hypothesisThomas schellingVickrey clarke groves mechanismWilliam donald hamiltonWilliam vickreyWin win gameAffine minimal surfaceAutomata minimization ofBranching pointMaximal and minimal extensionsMaximal and minimal operatorsMaximization and minimization of functionsMaxima and minimaMaximum and minimum pointsMinimal discrepancy methodMinimal functional calculusMinimal iteration methodMinimal normal subgroupMinimal propertyMinimal propositional calculusMinimal sufficient statisticMinimax principleMinimax propertyMinimax statistical procedureMinimization methods for functions depending strongly on a few variablesMinimization of an areaMinimization of the labour of calculationMinimizing sequenceMinimizing sequence for an operatorMinimumNash theoremNon cooperative gameSaddle point in game theorySolution in game theoryStability in game theoryStrong relative minimumSullivan minimal modelUnimodular elementUnimodular transformationWeak relative minimum

The Announcement That Told Nobody Anything

A stranger says out loud what every islander can already see, and ten days later ten people leave. The fact was mutual knowledge all along; what the announcement supplied was the nine levels of nested knowledge above it. An explicit count over 4096 possible worlds settles the induction without trusting it.

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Three Rolls, One Decision, and 14/3

A die is rolled up to three times and you are paid the face you stop on. The reflex answer of 3.5 is the value of the same game with the right to stop deleted, and the real value is 14/3, reached by computing the game from its last roll backwards. The thresholds move as rolls run out, which is why a four is worth keeping late and worth rejecting early.

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Blue, and the Two Sentences That Contain No Answer

Of the eight colour triples, seven are feasible from a pool of three blue hats and two red. The first silence removes one, the second removes two more, and all four survivors put a blue hat on the third man, which is what makes his answer a deduction rather than a lucky call. A pool sweep shows three blue and two red is the only small pool where the story can happen.

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The Weakest Player Should Waste the Turn

You hit one time in ten, your two opponents three and six, and you shoot first. Firing into the air is worth 965/4736 = 20.376%, which beats removing the strongest player by 0.195 percentage points, because a landed hit drops you into the duel you must enter second at 7/37 rather than first at 10/37. The article carries all three option values, the fixed points they solve, and the single Nash equilibrium that turns the usual assumption into a conclusion.

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